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rule which defines theft under the insurance contract as "theft as
common thought and common speech would now image and describe
it."6 A contrary result is reached by some courts on the ground that
statutes have broadened the crime of larceny by expressly making
certain acts, larceny which did not contain all of the common law
elements.7
The Indiana court defines felonious intent as the common law
understood it. Taking an automobile temporarily without the consent
of the owner, therefore, is not theft8 even though a more severe
punishment is meted out to the wrong-doer than in grand larceny.9
The Federal court reconciles the statutes with the common law definition
and holds, use inconsistent with the property interest of the owner is
included within the theft clause.
A strict application of the common law seems to justify the
Indiana decision. However, in view of the rule of interpretation favor-
ing the insured as well as the statutory changes of intent in larceny,
the more modern view of the Federal court is to be commended.
A.M.H.
LABOR LAW
LABOR INJUNCTION AND FREE SPEECH
Union coal miners peacefully picketed a coal mine in an effort to
procure employment at the union wage scale. Meanwhile, non-union
miners negotiated a lease contract under which they operated the
mine, the owner receiving a flat price per ton. The trial court
granted the non-union miners an interlocutory order enjoining the
picketing. Held, reversed. An injunction against peaceful picketing
violates the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion. Davis v. Yates, 32 N.E. (2d) 86 (Ind. 1941).
6 Cardozo, J., in Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239
N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432, 433 (1923). Cases, however, differ
widely as to what "common speech" would mean as theft. Note(1931) 89 A. L. R. 466.
7 Nugent v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 61, 13 P. (2d) 343(1932) (larceny by trick); Brady v. Norwich Union Fire Ins.
Soc., 47 R. I. 416, 133 Atl. 799 (1926) (false pretenses); Southern
Casualty Co. v. Landry, 266 S. W. 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
(larceny by bailee); N. Y. PENAL LAW (1939) § 1290; ANN. LAWS
OF MASS. (1933) c. 266, § 30; 6 BERRY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES (7th
ed. 1935) § 6.586.
But see Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 85 Ind. App.
674, 155 N. E. 533 (1926). In suit by insurer of owner of car
against garage for acts of employee in taking car and wrecking
it, the lower court cites the Indiana statute on vehicle taking and
states, "And a person who violates this statute and is thereafter
convicted and punished in accordance with its provisions may
very properly be said to be guilty of stealing an automobile, and
in referring to his act, it would be proper to say he stole an
automobile, or that, in so doing he committed a theft."
9 IND STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 10-3001 (grand larceny-punishable
by imprisonment from 1 to 10 years); id. § 10-3010 (vehicle taking
-first offense punishable by imprisonment from 1 to 10 years
and second offense from 3 to 10 years).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 595
Indiana's anti-injunction statute, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)
§40-501, protects peaceful picketing from injunctive restraint regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. Nevertheless, the application of this statute has been
judicially limited to labor controversies where the disputants are in an
employer-employee relation. Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail
Clerks Union, 24 N.E. (2d) 280 (Ind. 1939); see Muncie Bldg. Trades
Council v. Umbarger, 215 Ind. 13, 15, 17 N.E. (2d) 828, 829 (1938).
But the principal decision was not based upon the Indiana anti-
injunction statute. Instead, the court adopted the view that peaceful
picketing, being essentially a medium of publicity, was protected by
the constitutional guarantee of free speech. The doctrine that peaceful
picketing is protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth
Amendment was first enunciated in cases finding state anti-picketing
statutes unconstitutional. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). Recently, it has been
applied to invalidate injunctions issued by state courts restraining
peaceful picketing where no employer-employee relation existed.
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 61 Sup. Ct. 568 (1941); see
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 61 Sup. Ct. 552,
556 (1941). The principal case by implication overrules the Roth case.
However, in result, it is consistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U. S. 552 (1938); Lauf
v. Skinner, 303 U. S. 323 (1938), 13 Ind. L. J. 516. As a result of the
principal case any injunction restraining peaceful picketing, even in
intra-state commerce, can now be tested by a direct appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 61
Sup. Ct. 568 (1941).
N.C.B.
TORTS
LIBEL OF RELATIVES OF A DECEASED PERSON
Defendant newspaper published an article concerning the death
of the plaintiff's father and husband erroneously identifying him as
a notorious murderer. The plaintiffs, who were mentioned only as
the surviving wife and children of the deceased, sued to recover dam-
ages for injuries to their reputations. Held, no recovery. Rose v.
Daily Mirror, Inc., 31 N. E. (2d) 182 (N. Y. 1940).
Most jurisdictions deny recovery by anyone for libel of the mem-
ory of a deceased. Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App. 732, 202 Pac. 887
(1921) ; Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449, 79 N. W. 122
(1899). Contra: OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 724. However, the question
actually involved in the principal case is whether there was a libel of
the plaintiffs themselves. The majority of the court discussed only
recovery for libel of the deceased. The dissenting opinion, however, is
focused entirely on the defamation of the plaintiffs.
It is libelous to falsely assert that one is illegitimate because
it reflects on the family of the plaintiff. But although the defama-
tion relates primarily to the family, the child can recover. Harris
